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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Sections 78-2-2(3) to
(4) and 78-2a-2(2)(j), of the Utah Code.
ISSUES
1.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in not permitting Lowery to amend his
Complaint at the time of the hearing on Brigham Young University's Motion to
Dismiss?

2.

Did the Trial Court err in granting Brigham Young University's Motion to
Dismiss or in the alternative, can the Motion to Dismiss be sustained on other
grounds apparent on the record?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

The trial court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Amend should be affirmed

"absent a clear abuse of discretion." Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994). Under
an abuse of discretion standard, the trial court should not be reversed "unless [its] decision
exceeds the limits of reasonability."/J. (quoting Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243
(Utah 1994).
2.

The trial court's dismissal of Appellant's Complaint under Rule 12(b) should be

reviewed according to a correctness standard. Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999). This Court need not accord any deference to the trial court's determinations, and it
may affirm the judgment from which Appellant is appealing "if it is sustainable on any legal
theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or
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theory . . . was not considered or passed on by the lower court." Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d
1225, 1230 (Utah 2001) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass '«, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.
2 (Utah 1969).
COURSE OF PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Beginning in July 1993 Appellant, Lowery, worked for Brigham Young University
(hereafter "BYU") as a visiting professor in the College of Political Science. Record, at p. 2, 328
- 329 (hereafter "R. p.

"). While ultimately Lowery was denied a permanent teaching position

with BYU he continued to teach, off and on, in either a full or part-time basis through February
2001. Id. Thereafter, alleging he had suffered a major psychological collapse in May of 1997,
Lowery began filing a series of lawsuits against BYU and various University officials. R. p. 319
The first suit was a worker's compensation claim filed in March 2001 claiming the 1997 mental
breakdown was covered by worker's compensation. Id. This case was followed by a wrongful
termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other tort claims again arising out of
the May 1997 psychological collapse which was filed on March 15,2001. Id.
The worker's compensation suit was dismissed in September, Id., 392, and the suit for
wrongful termination and other tort claims were dismissed by Judge Nehring on October 25,
2001. See, Lowery v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, et ah, Case No.
010902154. The wrongful termination suit was re-filed by Lowery and has recently been again
dismissed this time by Judge Medley. See, Lowery v. Southern Virginia University, et al9 Case
No. 020912831.
This action was filed by Lowery on March 8,2002, R. p. 1, alleging in the rambling
twenty page ninety six paragraph Complaint, R. p. 1-25, tort claims, including claims for
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negligence, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty,
defamation, etc., all arising out of an incident which he described as having taken place in March
of 1995. Id.
After the filing of the complaint and a request for accommodation in the scheduling of
any responsive or other pleadings, R. p. 31, BYU filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 1, 2002. R.
p. 83 On September 9, 2002, the trial court issued an order granting BYU's Motion to Dismiss.
R. p. 426, Lowery protested the order and requested that he be given an opportunity to appear
and to argue the motion. The trial court then withdrew its order granting BYU's motion and
scheduled the matter for hearing. BYU's Motion to Dismiss was briefed and set for hearing on
October 18, 2002. R. p. 431 - 433
At the time of the hearing, Lowery submitted to the trial court a request to amend his
Complaint and submitted with that request a pleading entitled, "Amended Complaint." R. p. 439
- 464. Lowery's proposed amendment was discussed at length with the trial court, R. p. 531,
and as part of that discussion, the issues surrounding the Motion to Dismiss and the effect that
the amendment would have on that motion were addressed. The motions were argued by
Lowery, appearing pro se. Id.; R. p. 435.
On December 12, 2002, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order granting
BYU's Motion to Dismiss. R. p. 512 - 517. The Court designated its Memorandum Decision as
a final order of the Court, R. p. 516, and Lowery filed his Notice of Appeal on December 31,
2002. R.p. 518.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
This case arises out of a letter of recommendation that Lowery wrote in March of 1995
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for Allen Thomason, an applicant for graduate school at BYU. R. p. 2. The letter was written
on a pre-printed application form which asked the applicant for a "Confidential Letter of
Recommendation" to be delivered to the Marriott School of Management. R. p. 2 2 - 2 3 . The
applicant requested the letter of Lowery and delivered it with the rest of the application to BYU
Marriott School of Management. R. p. 2.
After submitting all of the documents to the Marriott School of Management, Thomason
allegedly contacted the Marriott School of Management for the purposes of duplicating his
application so he could submit it to the J. Reuben Clark Law School for admission there. R. p. 5.
In response to Thomason's request and during the process of copying his application documents,
the letter that had been prepared by Lowery was given to Thomason. R. p. 5.
It is alleged that the letter of recommendation contained negative remarks concerning
Thomason and his social capabilities. R. p. 2. Lowery alleges that because of the release of the
confidential letter and the resulting disclosure of the negative comments concerning Thomason,
Thomason contacted Lowery and curtly requested an opportunity to visit with Lowery in his
home. R. p. 3. In that visit it is alleged that there was a verbal confrontation where Lowery
feared for his safety. R. p. 3. Lowery had apparently been so agitated about Thomason's visit
that he had prepared a firearm which he hid under the cushion of his couch should Thomason
become violent. R. p. 3. The confrontation did not move beyond the verbal stage and Thomason
left without further incident. R. p. 4. From this confrontation Lowery claims that he had various
emotional reactions, including severe biochemical distress, fear of physical harm, anxiety,
nervousness, sleeplessness, humiliation, embarrassment, inability to concentrate, intense pain in
his head, neck, shoulders and back, nightmares, disrupted sleeping patterns, fatigue, overreaction
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or inordinate reaction. R. p. 9. Lowery's proposed amendment sought to add the May 1997
mental breakdown to the list of emotional reactions to the incident. R. p. 439.
After this verbal confrontation with Thomason, Lowery alleges that he tried to retrieve his
letter of recommendation by contacting the secretary of the Marriott School of Management, and
also by contacting Eugene Bramhall, BYU's General Counsel. R. p. 7. From those contacts,
Lowery claims that the secretary and BYU's General Counsel lied or deceived him concerning
the retrieval of the letter. R. p. 8.

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Lowery to amend his
Complaint because the amendment was both untimely and it did not resolve the challenges raised
by BYU in its Motion to Dismiss. Lowery's attempt to use the discovery rule to extend the
statute of limitations is flawed because the discovery rule does not apply to causes of action that
are discovered during the statute of limitations period. By his own admission Lowery knew of
the claim that he sought to add by amendment during the statute of limitations period. His failure
to file that claim for another three years and after the running of the statute of limitations
precludes the application of the discovery rule.
The trial court did not err in granting BYU's Motion to dismiss on the basis of the
running of the statute of limitation since Lowery's Complaint was file some seven years after the
accrual the claim. His claim that the statute of limitations was tolled for most if not all of that
time because of his mental illness is not supported by the pleadings and certainly not justified by
the record. The fact that this is the third lawsuit that he has filed against BYU during the period
of the statute of limitation is evidence enough that he understood his legal rights and how to
protect them.
Finally, the record is sufficient to demonstrate that even though the trial court did not rule
on the other grounds for dismissing Lowery's Complaint, those ground are a sufficient basis to
justify the dismissal of this case.

6

ARGUMENT
A.

THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING LOWERY'S
MOTION TO AMEND
Lowery's attempt to amend his complaint at the time of the hearing on BYU's Motion to

Dismiss was rejected by the Court for two reasons, R. p. 531 (page 1); 512, both of which are
well justified and are certainly not a "clear abuse of discretion." The first was that it was late. It
was submitted moments before the scheduled hearing on BYU's Motion to Dismiss.1 The
second, and most important reason is that the attempted amendment did not and would not affect
or resolve the issues raised in BYU's motion.
The Court's management of its calendar and the pleadings in its case is left to the broad
discretion of the Court and will not be overturned except in rare circumstances. There is nothing
about the circumstance here which would justify an overturning of the Court's exercise of its
discretion.
Further, the proposed amendment did not substantially or procedurally affect the pending
Motion to Dismiss. The amendment sought to add two new paragraphs which tried to relate a
May 1997 alleged mental breakdown to the events plead in the original complaint. R. p. 439.
Lowery contends that he did not discover the connection between the 1995 events and the 1997
incident until it was revealed in psychotherapy in November of 1998. It was apparently Lowery's
hope that with the linking of his mental breakdown in 1997, and its alleged "discovery " in

'"An amendment of a pleading should not be allowed to defeat a motion for summary
judgment if the amendment does not effect any substantial change in the issues as they were
originally formulated in the pleading." HCA Health Services of Utah, Inc., v. St. Mark's
Charities, 846 P.2d 476, 480 (Utah 1993) citing Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah
1960).
7

November of 1998, with the events of 1995 that he could extend the running of the statute of
limitation sufficiently to keep his filing of a Complaint in 2002 from being stale. R. p. 471.
The Court's dismissal of the Complaint and rejection of the Appellant's use of the
statutory tolling provision to prevent the running of the statute of limitations is covered in the
Court's Memorandum Decision and will be discussed below. See pp. 11. Lowery's attempt to
amend his pleading and use the "discovery rule" to extend the statute of limitations was
fundamentally flawed and the trial court was justified in refusing the amendment.
Statute of limitations "are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981),
(citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)).
In furtherance of that policy, the general rule is that a cause of action accrues upon
the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. Under
that rule, mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the
running of the statute of limitations.
Id. (footnotes omitted); See also, Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983);
Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 1AA P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987).
There are several statutory and court generated exceptions to this exacting rule including
the "discovery rule." Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d at 1254; Myers, 635 P.2d at 86.
[T]he discovery rule is incorporated into the statute whereby the statute is not
tolled until the facts forming the basis for the cause of action are discovered. In
other circumstances, concealment or misleading by a party prevents that party
from relying on the statute of limitations. Finally, there are exceptional
circumstances that would make application of the general rule irrational or unjust.

Becton Dickinson & Co., 668 P.2d at 1257.
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In the application of the discovery rule, however, the Utah Courts have uniformly held
that it does not apply where the plaintiff became aware of the cause of action before the statute of
limitations expired and did not file it.
While the discovery rule has often been applied to give a plaintiff the opportunity
to file his action after learning certain critical facts, the discovery rule has no
application here. We held in Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction
Co., 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987), that the discovery rule does not apply to a
plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of
action before the statute of limitations expires.
Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,. 823 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Utah 1992).
Any allegations concerning Lowery's psychotic episode in May of 1997, if truly causally
related to the events of two years prior, are at best additional damages or aggravations relating to
the original claim. Lowery did not allege and has not attempted to allege that no damage
occurred between the happening of the original event in March of 1995 and May of 1997, but
appeared to claim that the new episode in 1997 created a new element of damage. Apparently he
was looking for a later date to which he could attach his claim to delay the running of the statute
of limitations. Because the additional paragraphs deal only with the adding of additional
damages, but not the actual accrual of the cause of action, the accrual of the cause of action is not
changed from March of 1995 until May of 1997 or November of 1998. R. p. 471. An additional
claim of damages does not create a new cause of action, or extend the statute of limitation on an
existing claim. Jepson v. State of Utah, 846 P.2d 485,487 (Utah 1993)("cause of action . . .
accrued on the date of the accident. At that point.. .[plaintiff] had sustained injury to support a
cause of action, irrespective of whether 'the full extent of damages has been ascertained'"); State
Ins. Fundv. Industrial Commission, et al, 209 P.2d 558, 561 (Utah 1949)(" Certainly in actions
for damages caused by negligence, it is the event of the negligence which causes the damage and
9

not the ascertainment of the extent of the damage which accrues the cause of action.")
There is nothing about the discovery of the connection, if any, between the 1997 mental
breakdown with the actions in 1995 that creates a new cause of action. Even if the connection is
deemed to be a "critical fact" in Lowery's case its discovery during the period of the original
statute of limitations prevents it from being used to extend the statute of limitation for four more
years as Lowery attempts to do here. Paulsen, 744 P.2d at 1373.
In Paulsen, which dealt with a construction defect which was not discovered until almost
a year after the construction project had been completed, the Utah Supreme Court held that the
statute of limitations began to run with the completion of the construction process and that
because BYU became aware of the defect during the applicable six-year statute of limitations it
was obligated to bring the action during that original six-year term. The Utah Supreme Court
found no basis upon which to move the beginning of the statute of limitations forward until the
date of the discovery of the defect. The Utah Supreme Court stated:
BYU claims, however, that it is entitled to have the statute tolled until [it]
discovered that it had a claim against Paulsen. It argues that the facts of this case
warrant application of the discovery rule, i.e., the rule that a cause of action does
not accrue until the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts giving rise to
the cause of action. BYU contends that it did not know that Paulsen had
permitted the installation of improper insulation on hot water pipes until it dug the
pipes up in May of 1979 and, therefore, the statute of limitations should not run
until May of 1985. Because the action was filed on February 1, 1983, BYU
asserts that it was not time-barred.
Id. at 1373-4.
The Court went on to state that:
The general rule in Utah is that "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of
action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations." Becton
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d at 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983); Myers v.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). We have sanctioned invocation of the
10

discovery rule, but only when "the application of the general rule would be
irrational or unjust." Becton, Dickinson, 668 P.2d at 1257; Myers, 635 P.2d at 86.
Id. at 1374.
The Court concluded that because BYU had discovered the leakage and improper pipe
installation prior to the expiration of the limitation period, that the discovery rule "has no
application when an action easily could have been filed between the date of discovery and the
end of the limitation period." Id.
In this instance, by his own pleadings, Lowery states that he was aware of and did make a
connection between the March 1995 incident and the May 1997 breakdown before the four-year
statute of limitations applicable to his original claim expired. From his own statement of facts it
is evident that Lowery would have had the better part of a year to file a complaint after receiving
his psychotherapy, which allegedly established the connection between the original actions and
his mental breakdown in which to file. R. p. 439. He provides no explanation for why he did not
file until almost four years later—except for his lifelong mental problems. It is important to note
that during this substantial delay, however, Lowery as a pro se plaintiff, or through counsel, filed
three law suits; two of which were against BYU, and both specifically made claims against BYU
for his May 20, 1997 mental breakdown. R. p. 91. Lowery's attempt to amend his Complaint to
graft the May 1997 breakdown onto his 1995 claim is merely an attempt to revive a claim that
had been repeatedly dismissed.
Under the facts submitted by the plaintiff there is no basis for extending the statute of
limitations on the 1995 claim by way of pleading the inclusion of the May 20, 1997 mental
breakdown, either directly as a new claim, or indirectly by way of the discovery rule. The court
was justified in exercising its discretion in refusing to permit the amendment which did not
11

materially advance the claims he had already made and certainly did not respond to or remove the
basis upon which BYU's Motion to Dismiss was founded. Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817
(UtahCtApp. 1988).2
B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD LAPSED.
The trial court did not err in dismissing the Lowery's Complaint on the basis that it was

barred by the statute of limitations. The general statute of limitations for all of the alleged causes
of actions is governed by Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-25 and requires that any claim be
brought within four years of the happening of the last event necessary to complete a cause of
action. From the face of the Lowery's Complaint, his cause of action lapsed under this general
statute of limitations in March of 1999, over three years prior to the filing of the Complaint.
To avoid the running of the statute of limitations Lowery plead in his Complaint that "at
all times relevant hereto he was mentally ill," R. p. 1, and that under § 78-12-36, the statute of
limitations is tolled. While plaintiff has painted a long history of personal and employment
problems including a history of bi-polar mental illness, the fact that he is mentally ill is not
dispositive of the question of incapacity sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. In O'Neal v.
Division of Family Services, the Court wrote:
In determining what sort of lack of ability and capacity to protect one's legal
rights qualifies for disability protection, courts generally hold that a person is
incompetent for the purposes of a provision tolling a statute of limitations "when
the disability is of such a nature to show him [or her] unable to manage his [or
her] business affairs or estate, or to comprehend his [or her] legal rights or

2

The standard of freely allowing amendments under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is a standard for the trial court to implement; the standard on review is the higher
standard of determining if the Trial Court abused its discretion in implementing the rule. See
Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
12

liabilities.
821 P.2d al 139, 1142 (Utah 1991)(citation omitted).
A time line of the plaintiffs activities since 1995 and his own admissions demonstrate
that while struggling with a mental illness he was not so impaired as to meet the definition of
mentally incompetent as provided in § 78-12-36.3 R. p. 32, 37, 172 - 174. Specifically, plaintiff

3

Several other states have adopted statutes similar to Utah's tolling statute. For example,
California's statute provides that if a person is, "at the time the cause of action accrued either
under the age of majority or insane, the time of the disability is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352 (West Supp. 2003). California courts
have interpreted insanity as being "incapable of caring for his [or her] property or transacting
business or understanding the nature or effects of his [or her] acts." Feeley v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 234 Cal. App. 3d 949, 952 (1st Dist. 1991). The level of insanity in California required by
the tolling statutes can be greater than even the level of insanity required to be committed into a
mental institution. In Feeley, the court, in determining unconsciousness constitutes insanity for
purpose of tolling the statute of limitations, noted that "the standard expressed in the cases,
though often cast in term of 'mental derangement,' actually requires only some mental condition
which renders the plaintiff incapable." Id. The court also noted that an adjudication of insanity
or commitment to a state mental hospital did not conclusively determine insanity under the
tolling statute. Id. at 952-53; see also, Hsu v. Mr. Zion Hospital, 249 Cal. App. 2d 562, 572 (1st
Dist, 1968) ("The rationale underlying the cases that hold that an adjudication of mental illness
arising out of a commitment proceeding is not conclusive evidence of insanity is that the purpose
of such a proceeding is not to determine whether such a person is incapable of caring for his
property . . . or understanding the nature or effects of his acts, but rather to determine whether
the person is in fact in such a mental condition as to justify the state in depriving him of his
personal liberty and affording him . . . the benefit of proper care and remedial aid.").
Arizona also has a similar tolling statute for persons who are of unsound mind or are
under a disability. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-502 (1992). Arizona has adopted a two part test to
define someone of unsound mind. A plaintiff must show that "he is unable to manage his affairs
or to understand his legal rights or liabilities." Allen v. Powell's Int'l, Inc., 518 P.2d 588, 589
(Ariz. 1974); see also, Nolde v. Frankie, 964 P.2d 477 (Ariz. 1998). To justify a tolling of the
statute, a plaintiff must show "empirical facts easily verifiable and more difficult to fabricate than
a narrow claim of inability to bring the action." Nolde, 964 P.2d at 483. Like California and
Utah, Arizona has recognized that the level of insanity required to toll the statute of limitation is
greater than having mere psychological problems. If evidence exists that shows a plaintiff is able
to comprehend his or her legal rights and "able to maintain employment, to handle financial
affairs, to manage [his or her] daily affairs, and to take care of [him or herself)," a plaintiff will
not be allowed to toll the statute of limitations simply by showing depression, post-traumatic
stress disorder, stress, sexual identity problems, or other psychological disorders. Florez v.
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has, and by his own admission, does appreciate his legal rights, and has demonstrated his ability
to appreciate those rights and pursue them through the Courts.
Prior to March of 1995, plaintiff worked for BYU as a part-time teacher from July
1993 to August 1993; again from January 1994 to April 1994; and finally from
July 1994 to December 1994. R. p. 328 - 329.
In 1995 plaintiff worked the full year as a part-time faculty member. R. p. 328 329.
In March of 1995 plaintiff was not being treated for any mental illness, and did
not receive treatment for any mental illness until after what has been described as
a mental breakdown in May of 1997. R. p. 173
In December 1995 the plaintiff applied for a tenure track position at BYU. He was
turned down for that appointment. R. p. 346.
In January 1996 plaintiff worked as a part-time faculty member at BYU from
January through August. R. p. 328 - 329.
In August 1996 plaintiff took a full-time faculty position at Southern Virginia
University. He worked at SVU for nine months. R. p. 347.
In 1997, plaintiff again worked as a part-time faculty for BYU from May through
August. R. p. 328 -329
In 1998, plaintiff worked for BYU as a part-time faculty from May through
August. Id.
Beginning in January 2000 through and including February 16, 2001, plaintiff
worked at BYU in an administrative staff position. Id.
In July 2000, Lowery as plaintiff and moving party in the action filed for divorce.
That matter was not finalized until July 2, 2002. R. p. 326.
In March 2001, Lowery as Petitioner filed an action with the Labor Commission
seeking a worker's compensation award against BYU. The application for

Sargeant, 917 P.2d 250, 252-53 (Ariz. 1996); see also, Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951 (Ariz. 1998)
(summary judgment was held improper where the plaintiff established that she (1) was unable to
function in day-to-day affairs; (2) experienced suicidal tendencies and was institutionalized; (3)
quit her job and could not seek other employment; and (4) was unable to seek or address the
issues with legal counsel).
Arizona, like Utah, also recognizes that the plaintiff must prove that the insanity existed
at the time the cause of action accrued. "Arizona is . . . in line with the general rule that personal
disabilities commencing after the time the cause of action accrues do not toll the statute of
limitations." Nelson v. Nelson, 669 P.2d 990, 992 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). This is in line with a
majority of the surrounding states. See e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352 (West Supp. 2003); Colo
Rev. Stat. § 13-81-103 (West Supp. 2003); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-13 (1993); Idaho Code § 5-230
(Michie 1998); Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.250 (2001); Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.170 (2001);Wash. Rev. Code §
4.16.250(2002).

14

•

•

benefits was based upon mental stress related to the denial of employment which
occurred on May 20, 1997. That matter was heard on August 22, 2001, with
Lowery present, and was dismissed on September 7, 2001. R. p. 392.
On March 15, 2001, Lowery as a pro se plaintiff filed suit in the Third District
Court against BYU and a long list of other defendants claiming, among other
things, 133 causes of action for wrongful termination of his BYU employment,
intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress, abuse of authority, breach
of contract, fraudulent deception, breach of fiduciary trust, conspiracy to violate
civil rights, clergy malpractice, loss of consortium, etc. R. p. 319.
This action was filed on March 8,2002. R. p. 1.

Such a history is not consistent with the standard set for invoking the tolling provisions of
§78-12-36. To work, actively pursue litigation and at the same time claim that the statute of
limitations is tolled because the plaintiff is so mentally ill that he does not appreciate his rights or
can not manage his affairs is inappropriate. Furthermore, Lowery represents that he has been
mentally ill since a very young age. R. p. 172 If such an allegation supports a tolling of the
statute of limitations, Lowery would be free to file and re-file his claims in perpetuity.
Finally, Lowery places great stock in the alleged finding of the Court in his divorce that
he is mentally ill. R. p. 376. A closer look at the Court's finding, however, does not bear out his
claim. In the divorce action the Court did not adjudicate Lowery's mentally illness. The focus of
the inquiry did not even go to the issue of general or even specific competency, instead it went to
the issue of whether Lowery had a disability that prevented him from working in whole or in
part. R. p. 377. Ultimately the Court was call upon to reconcile the divergent testimony of three
experts as to the "degree" or "parameters of the illness." R. p. 377. That inquiry led the Court to
determine that Lowery was disabled but could earn some income. R. p. 380. The Court went on
to value his ability to earn an income and how that would affect an award of alimony. R. p. 379 380. This finding is a far cry from a determination that Lowery could not manage his affairs or
appreciate his legal rights.
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Finally, as was argued before the trial court Lowery himself has described his disability
and concedes that he does appreciate the legal process and his legal rights. He indicates that his
mental illness slows his ability to process legal documents but does not take from him his ability
to understand or respond. Lowery's history does not support a claim of mental incompetence of
a nature that would invoke a tolling of the statute of limitations.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DISMISS LOWERY'S COMPLAINT
CAN AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON OTHER GROUNDS
BYU's Motion to Dismiss raised not only the statute of limitations as a basis for the

dismissal of the Lowery's Complaint but challenged each and every one of the various theories
that were put forward. On review it is well accepted that the Court can affirm the trial court's
ruling on any basis apparent on the record. Since BYU has raised and argued independent
grounds for dismissal of each and every one of the Lowery's claims, this Court can and should
affirm the lower court's dismissal of the Complaint on those grounds.
1. Plaintiff Has Not and Can Not State a Claim of Negligence.
As to Lowery's various claims of negligence, they all revolve around the same operative
facts, viz., BYU was negligent in giving or allowing Thomason access to the confidential letter
Lowery prepared as part of Thomason's application. These facts, however, do not state or support
any recognized cause of action let alone a cause of action in negligence.
To state a claim of negligence "a plaintiff must show four things: duty, breach of duty,
causation, and damages." Gerbich v. Numedlnc, 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999)(citing Rocky
Mountain Thrift Corp. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 887 P.2d 848, 851 (Utah 1994)). In this case, the
plaintiff has failed to claim or establish any duty owed by BYU to him personally. First, there is
nothing in the form or directions about the recommendation letter he was asked to provide that
16

established any kind of duty on the part of BYU or right granted to him as the provider of the
letter.
Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged injuries came from a confrontation-verbal assault-with a
third party, not a representative or agent of BYU. It is well established that in order to create a
duty to control a third party or protect someone from the acts of a third party, particularly tortious
acts, a plaintiff must establish a "special relationship" between himself and the defendant. See,
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231 (Utah 1993).
Lowery has not plead a "special relationship" and the facts do not support imposing on
BYU a duty to protect or control a third party assailant. Because no duty can be established and
certainly no "special relationship" exists, all claims of negligence relating to the assault by the
third party should be dismissed. There is nothing in any of the pleadings that would establish any
duty BYU owed to this plaintiff which was breached.
Finally, Lowery contended that the "Confidential Letter of Recommendation for the
Marriott School of Management Programs" demonstrate that BYU "offered and created [a] duty
to protect the plaintiff." R. p. 364. Such is clearly not the case. The confidential letter, which is
the heart of this suit, is a pre-printed form which is provided to the applicant, and the applicant is
the one who identifies and solicits the recommendation. R. p. 331. Reference to confidentiality
is referred to in the document and states:
The above individual has applied for admission to Brigham Young University's
Marriott School of Management and is requesting a recommendation from you.
The MSM will select those students who show the greatest promise of success as
leaders in the private and public sectors. May we have your assistance in
evaluating this applicant's potential. Your frank and confidential evaluation or his
or her abilities and attitudes will be appreciated.
17

See Confidential Letter, R. p. 22-23.
Furthermore, the reviewer is directed to: "Please send your recommendation to the
applicant in the pre-addressed envelope. Sign your name across the back of the envelope after
sealing."
Id.
The applicant does not act as an agent of BYU in soliciting a recommendation but acts on
his own behalf in fulfilling the application requirements. The evaluator is not obligated to BYU
to provide any evaluation and does so only at the request of the applicant. By signing the first
part of the reference, the applicant certifies that "I agree that this reference may be maintained as
a confidential university record. I hereby waive any right I may have under any statute or
university policy to obtain access to this recommendation." Id. (Emphasis added).
The university is not obligated to maintain the letter as a "confidential university record"
but may do so if it elects. Furthermore, the university does not represent in this document how,
in fact, the reference will be held. Finally, because the evaluator can elect not to provide a
recommendation, if he so chooses, the request is simply "may we have your assistance in
evaluating this applicant's potential." Under these facts there is no indication that the letter will,
in fact, become a confidential university record, and there certainly is no guarantee or any
representation regarding the university taking upon itself an obligation to ensure the safety of any
evaluator. Under the terms of the Confidential Letter, if there is a breach of any obligation, it
would be on the part of the applicant who availed himself of access to the evaluation.
2. Lowery Does Not and Can Not State a Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress.
The Utah Supreme Court first outlined the test for a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961). In that case the
18

Court found that a plaintiff must allege that the defendant must "intentionally engage in some
contact... (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) any reasonable person
would have known that such would result." Id. at 346-47. The Court also held that the actions
must be "of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offended
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Id. While articulating these
standards, the Utah Supreme Court has also gone firmly on record that it dislikes this cause of
action because it can be easily alleged and difficult to refute. Id. at 345. ("Due to the highly
subjective and volatile nature of emotional distress and the variability of its causation, the courts
have historically been wary of dangers in opening the doors to recovery therefrom. This is partly
because such claims may easily be fabricated; or as sometimes stated, are easy to assert and hard
to defend against.") Finally, the Supreme Court has directed that it is "for the court to determine,
in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme
and outrageous as to permit recovery... [T]he law intervenes only when the distress of infliction
is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it." Schuurman v.
Shingleton, 26 P.3d 227, 233 (Utah 2001)(citation omitted)(finding that the emotional distress
caused by a therapist sleeping with a psychological patient was not severe or outrageous enough
to justify recovery).
There is nothing in Lowery's pleadings that would rise to the level of stating a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Lowery has not alleged that BYXJ acted intentionally
with the purpose of inflicting emotional pain or suffering on him. Moreover, Lowery has not
alleged any act of BYU that was so outrageous that it offended generally accepted standards of
morality and decency. The facts plead by Lowery are not sufficient to support a claim of
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intentional infliction of emotional distress.
3. There is No Basis for a Claim of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.
The cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress has been recognized in a
number of different cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), Hansen v.
Mt. Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993). In recognizing such a cause of action, however,
the Utah Supreme Court indicated that it would follow Section 313 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts in determining the extent of such liability. Section 313 provides, in pertinent part, that
such a cause of action is manifest
[i]f the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject of the
liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor (a) should have
realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise
then by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and (b) from facts known to him
should have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily
harm.
In fulfilling these requirements, however, the courts have recognized that liability exists only if
the plaintiff can establish "resulting illness or bodily harm." See, Hansen v. Mt. Fuel Supply Co.,
858 P.2d at 974. The Utah Supreme Court indicated that the requirement of finding some
recognized illness or actual physical bodily harm is a necessity to provide a
check on feigned disturbances, thereby answering the genuineness of claims. Moreover,
emotional disturbance that is not severe enough to result in illness or physical
consequences is likely to be in the realm of the trivial. Such a disturbance is likely to be
so temporary and subjective that to attempt to compensate it would unduly burden
defendants and the courts. See, Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 436A (1965);
Paytont 437 N.E.2d at 178-79 (citing the Restatement).
Id.
As to emotional distress, the court indicated "that the emotional distress suffered must be
severe; it must be such that 'a reasonable [person] normally constituted, would be unable to

20

adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case'(citations
omitted)." Id. at 975. The court went on to indicate in Hansen that allegations of anxiety,
sleeplessness, headaches, depression, or other transitory physical phenomena are not the type of
injuries which sustain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court stated in
dismissing the Hansen action that
plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence indicating that their distress is
sufficiently severe to constitute mental illness, nor do we have evidence that their
distress has resulted in physical symptoms. Plaintiffs mere unsubstantiated
opinions that they have suffered severe anxiety as a result of their exposure do not
create a triable issue of fact that would withstand summary judgment.
Id
In this instance, the type of reaction that this plaintiff allegedly suffered at the hands of a
third party are not sufficient to maintain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress against BYU. Under the facts in this case there is no indication that the unintentional
acts alleged by Lowery are such that BYU should have realized that such conduct involved an
unreasonable risk of causing distress and that the distress would cause illness or bodily harm.4
4. There is No Basis for a Claim for a Cause of Action for Breach of a Duty of
Confidential Relations.
The doctrine of confidential relationships is founded on the notion that if such a
relationship exists, "any transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is reposed is presumed

4

Interestingly, Lowery's mental illness seems to have been caused by a myriad of different
events, unrelated to those plead here. First, Lowery contends that for all but five years of his life
he has been mentally ill and that the origin of such mental illness is organic, or at least genetic.
Second, he seems to point to the May 20, 1997 incident as being the precipitating event of his
mental collapse. Lowery has already sued BYU twice for the May 20, 1997 event, first in a
worker's compensation action and second, in a wrongful termination, and tort action.
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to have been unfair and to have resulted in undue influence and fraud." Webster v. Lehmer, 742
P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1987)(citing Von Hake, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985)). Cases in which
a breach of a confidential relationship exist all have essentially the same fact pattern. Those
cases have a dependent relationship created by an undue influence or extraordinary influence
being exerted for the benefit of the dominant party. Id. In this instance, no confidential
relationship was ever created, or even alleged, and certainly no transaction existed which
benefitted BYU to the detriment of the Lowery.
Since the courts have recognized that "mere confidence in one person by another is not
sufficient alone to constitute such a relationship," Id., Lowery's subjective feelings of
dependance or reliance are not sufficient to sustain a cause of action. In this case, since there was
neither the relationship nor any benefit that flowed to BYU, there is no basis for a claim.
Plaintiff describes the confidential relationship created with BYU as being created by
means of BYU's "institutional projection of itself as an institution of higher education with
extremely high standards of honesty, forthrightness, fairness, virtue, trustworthiness, piety, love
of all human beings, an advocate of strengthening families and individuals, especially those who
mourn and stand in need of comfort and special assistance such as the sick and afflicted,
including the mentally disabled . . . . " Opposition Memorandum, p. 40. Why this creates a
"confidential relationship" is not clear. It is clear, however, that such a relationship is not the
kind of confidential relationship that is recognized as a cause of action under Webster.
5. There is No Basis for a Cause of Action for Public Disclosure of Private Facts.
The claim of a cause of action based on public disclosure of private facts arises out of the
larger tort of invasion of privacy. See, Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374
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(Utah App. 1997). In Stien the court recognized four privacy torts, one of which is described as
"public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff." Id. at 378. As to that tort,
the court recognized three elements necessary to establish that claim:
(1) the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure and not a
private one;
(2) the facts disclosed to the public must be private facts and not public ones;
(3) the matter made public must be one that would be highly offensive and
objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.
In this instance, plaintiff has not alleged any of the three elements. There was no
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff in this case. Furthermore, the facts
that were disclosed, if any, were not ones that were highly offensive and objectionable to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. As such, there is no cause of action for any
disclosure.
6. Plaintiffs Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Should Be Dismissed.
Under Utah law, "a fiduciary . . . relationship will be found only 'when one party having
gained the trust and confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over the other
party.'" Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Utah 1996)(quoting Von
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985)). When parties deal at arms length or in an
adversarial relationship, no fiduciary relationship can be found as a matter of law. Id. In this
instance, there is no reason to expect nor can it be justly contended that BYU created a fiduciary
relationship with the plaintiff. Certainly none was alleged. Lowery's actions in providing a letter
concerning the suitability of a prospective graduate student did not create and could not be seen
as creating a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff.
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7. Plaintiffs Claim for Reckless Falsity and Deceit Should Be Dismissed.
There is no cause of action or claim for reckless falsity and deceit recognized in the State
of Utah.
8.

Plaintiffs Claim for Abuse of Power Should Be Dismissed

A claim based on allegations of abuse of power has only been recognized where
government officials have derogated their responsibilities and acted inappropriately within the
power structure created by the government. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah
1980). To the extent that an abuse of power claim is claimed between two individuals, such a
claim has not been countenanced in Utah.
9. Plaintiffs Claim for Negligent Hiring Should Be Dismissed.
To sustain a cause of action for negligent hiring in the State of Utah, a plaintiff must
establish (1) that the employer knew or should have known that its employees posed a
foreseeable risk to third parties; (2) the employees did, in fact, inflict such harm; and (3) the
employer's negligence in hiring, supervising, or retaining the employees proximately caused the
injury. See, Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949
(Utah 1992). Lowery has failed to allege these basic requirements including, and most
importantly, that BYU knew or should have know that its employees posed a foreseeable risk to
Lowery or any other person. In this instance, Lowery has failed to allege that BYU knew of any
situation where its employees were likely to, or in fact did, inflict any harm on any individual.
Furthermore, there is no allegation that BYU knew or had any reason to believe that its
employees, who may have been engaged in such activity, were negligently hired or retained, or
that there was any failure of supervision over such employees. The failure to plead such a cause
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of action makes it appropriate for the court to dismiss this claim.
10.

Breach of Contract.

Lowery's claim of breach of contract fails because he has not alleged any of the essential
elements of contract. No offer was made or accepted, no terms were agreed upon, no writing
exists which was signed by the obligated party, no consideration was paid or given for the duties
or obligations alleged, and there was no breach of any term or provision of the alleged
agreement. Thus, any claim of contract should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court appropriately refused Lowery's proposed amendment and then after due
deliberation and consideration of the argument presented dismissed Lowery's Complaint. Under
the applicable standards of review the trial court's decisions should be affirmed.
DATED this 15th day of May, 2003.

David B. Thomas (3228)
Attorney for Brigham Young University
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